rior channel relationship studies (Wathne et al. 2000) have suggested some common ground among Transaction Specific Investments (TSI), opportunism, and uncertainty. These factors continuously and frequently appear in the exchange context, which means that one of the parties involved in a transaction will be vulnerable. For instance, safeguarding issues make the invested party more vulnerable than the receiving party because expected damage is obviously substantial if the exchange relationship is terminated. Pursuing individual interests at the expense of the exchange partner harms the encounter and the relationship and consequently the opportunistic party itself. Adaptation problems due to uncertainty also destabilize exchange relationships because there is likely to be an increase in the motivation to switch partners (Heide and John 1990) . Therefore, this vulnerability translates into a need to develop control mechanisms to reduce transaction difficulties.
Previous researchers have identified several control mechanisms and provided useful insights regarding the efficacy of those mechanisms in interorganizational relationships (Jap and Ganesan 2000) . However, as marketing scholars (Wathne and Heide 2004) gradually recognized and emphasized the importance of the network context in business relationships, research attention has been increasingly moving from dyadic relationships to relationships occurring in network settings (Wuyts Stremersch, Bulte, and Franses 2004; McFarland, Blldgood, and Payan 2008; Gu, Kim, Tse, and Wang 2010 ). Yet, there are still some gaps in the knowledge. First, empirical studies concerning network contexts are still rare (Ghosh and John 1999) . Second, very few attempts have been made to investigate how the efficacy of control mechanisms in dyadic relationships varies when the relationship occurs in a context involving many actors, who are likely to influence the decision making process of the firms within the dyadic relationship.
To fill the gaps, we attempted to revisit the norms to better understand them in terms of obligational attributes of norms. Our research was based on a question about the consequences of breaching relational norms. Rules, contracts, law, and relational norms can be broken or breached. If a party involved in a transaction breached one of the first three relationships, it would be punished by law. Yet relational norms are not established by law but by internalization, hence there is no legal safeguard when these norms are broken. We argue that traditional dimensions that explain relational exchanges, such as "informational exchange," "solidarity," and "flexibility," are not enough to explain how these relationships are maintained without legal safeguards. Based on the consideration, we propose a new dimension of norms: the obligational feature. This new dimension would help firms understand how such norms function in a network context, which is more virtual setting of research than dyadic context. To test the network norm of obligation hypotheses, we developed the construct of a network norm of obligation to address the obligatory facets of relational norms, focusing on the sense of duty shared by actors in a network. In addition to the consideration of a network-level governance mechanism, we also provide empirical evidence. The network context more closely reflects a practical business environment in that it considers the consequences of one transaction relationship with an exchange partner on other transactions with other partners. Thus, it can more logically explain the mechanism of relational norms.
Theoretical Background and Hypotheses

Relational Norms
Norms are generally defined as expectations about behavior that are shared by a group of decision makers and that are directed toward collective or group goals (Gibbs 1981; Macneil 1980; Thibaut and Kelly 1959; Jap and Ganesan 2000) . Norms proscribe behaviors of exchange partners to prevent pursuing individual goals, to maintain a system, and to maintain the relationship as a whole (Heide and John 1992) . Relational norms have been considered an effective governance mechanism in managing channel relationships (Brown Dev, and Lee 2000) in that relational norms regulate the behavior of the parties which are involved in a exchange by causing internalization of behaviors in order to maintain moral control (Joshi and Stump 1999 ). Therefore, a high level of relational norms was found to effectively reduce opportunistic behaviors (Brown et al. 2000) . Furthermore, scholars (Heide and John 1992; Jap and Ganesan 2000) argued and empirically demonstrated that a high level of relational norms facilitates relinquishment of control over the decision making process of a firm, even in a transaction-specific investment. TABLE 1 summarizes definitions and operationalization of norms in some channel relationship literatures. Noordewier, John, and Nevin (1990) draw five elements from Palay (1984) and Kaufmann and Stern (1988) . Some (Heide and John 1992; Joshi and Stump 1999) or used as a single factor (Rokkan et al. 2003) to represent relational norms. Although these studies provide useful insights regarding the efficacy of relational norms, there are several gaps in the understanding of interorganizational governance (Jap and Ganesan 2000) . First, scholars have not considered obligational aspects of relational norms. As shown, most extant studies operationalized relational norms by employing some factors such as information exchange, solidarity, and flexibility. While we do not argue that these dimensions do not properly explain the attributes of relational norms, we do claim that another dimension, explaining the sense of duty of norms, should be considered in order to fully understand the attributes and hence the efficacy of relational norms. We argue that relational norms contain obligational attributes, a concept that has not yet been suggested by scholars. Obligational attributes might include such statements as "this is the way we do things in this relationship" (Joshi and Stump 1999 ) and suggest that parties should "refrain from any behaviors that might jeopardize" the relationship (Brown et al. 2000) . Constraining behaviors, preventing any harmful actions, and pursuing mutual interests instead of individual ones are hardly possible if relational norms do not embody obligational features. We argue that "expectations about behavior" in a business relationship imply that the involved participants should be obliged to behave in certain ways.
Second, extant studies have not discussed the consequences of breaching relational norms. When norms are established, they create certain patterns of behaviors because of shared expectations. If any party breaches these patterns, it will more likely be punished by others. In this sense, network context is useful in understanding the operation of relational norms. Network context can explain the results of breaching norms, how firms would understand and accept the results, and how such understanding would influence managerial decisions in exchange relationships. In summary, we will consider obligatory features of relational norms, which are established in a network consisting of manufacturers, prime suppliers, and second-tier suppliers.
Network Norm of Obligation
The current study defines the network norm of obligation as the sentiments and sense of responsibility that are expected to be fulfilled by the involved parties and that accrue among individual firms engaged in recurring contractual economic exchange (Dore 1983 ). In the study of the Japanese weaving industry, Dore (1983) reported on powerful norms of obligation which stabilize economic relationships and noted that Japanese firms say that "benevolence is a duty... it is that sense of duty, which gives the assurance of the pay-off which makes relational contracting viable." Relational norms have a "particular sense of diffuse obligation to the individual trading partner," as evidenced by Dore's study (1983) .
It should be noted that there is a difference between norms established in a dyadic relationship and norms established in a network. As noted earlier, previous studies (Heide and John 1992 ) discussed relational norms in dyadic contexts. Scholars found that relational norms have a positive relationship with dependence, long-term orientation (Joshi and Stump 1999) , and commitment (Jap and Ganesan 2000) and a negative relationship with opportunism (Brown et al. 2000; Jap and Anderson 2003) . However, the dyadic context employed in the studies inhibited scholars from considering the basis of relational norms that makes firms possible to govern exchange partners, which consequentially stabilize the economic system and maintain the exchange relationship. In that respect, studying norms which are established in a network may well explain the nature of the relational norms. Norms which are established in a network are shared by all network members. In this context, a firm's relationship with one exchange partner influences the firm's other relationships with other exchange partners within the network (Håkansson and Johanson 1993) . This implies that there is an interdyadic impact on the network. If a party unilaterally breached the norms without justification, it would be punished by other network members by such actions as exclusion from the network.
To operationalize the concept of a network norm of obligation, three facets were considered; (1) duty of sincere communication -that is, exchange parties should communicate sincerely with exchange partners, (2) duty of prompt responses -that is, exchange parties should reply as quickly as possible to the requests of exchange partners, and (3) duty of fair treatment -that is, exchange parties should treat all exchange partners fairly and not pursue personal benefits. The obligations are shared by all actors who are engaged in a network, not only between two exchange partners in a dyadic relationship. Thus, all network members are expected to have a sense of obligation of maintaining the relationship. The obligational attributes were drawn from a study of Waung and Brice (2007) , which studied applicant perceptions about the selection processes and procedures. In the study by Waung and Brice (2007) , the authors investigated how the students perceive organizations where they had applied for jobs, in terms of organizational obligation fulfillment. The students were also asked whether the organizations sent applicant status notifications (i.e., accepted vs. rejected), rejection notifications (i.e., no communication, notification of status, or notification plus explanation), and the length of time a student was under consideration for employment (e.g., the number of days to receive a rejection letter).
Based on that study, we created the duty of sincere communication from the rejection notification facet (i.e., the study posits that the students would perceive the organization to have fulfilled its obligation if they received notification of their rejection plus an explanation), duty of prompt responses from the length of time a student was under consideration for employment (i.e., the longer the time interval prior to receipt of the rejection communication, the less the organization was reported to have fulfilled its obligation), and duty of fair treatment from the applicant status letter question (e.g., the students perceived they were fairly treated when they received a rejection letter). Though this paper mainly focuses on obligational facets of relational norms, the existence of such norms also implies some sort of shared values (Bradach and Eccles 1991) among the parties engaged in an exchange relationship, which function as a governance mechanism in interorganizational relationships.
TSI and the Network Norm of Obligation
Previous studied argued (Noordewier et al. 1990 ) that the positive relationship between a supplier's TSI and its firm performance will be moderated by the network norm of obligation. More specifically, under a high level of network norm of obligation, the supplier's TSI will have a stronger positive influence on firm performance.
Transaction-specific investments (TSIs) refer to assets that are invested only for a certain exchange and where the investment value is almost nonexistent outside of the exchange. Due to such attributes, this type of investment represents the transferability of assets (Williamson 1985) and creates dependency of the firms that invest in these assets. When a supplier makes investments in a particular exchange relationship, it becomes vulnerable to the opportunistic exploitation of the investment receiver (Coase 1993; Heide and Stump 1995) . The vulnerability of the party is a function of the possibility of exploitation and the possibility of termination of the relationship, which makes the investment useless. Thus, the invested party, the supplier in this study, has a strong desire to maintain a healthy relationship and therefore, is more likely to put in effort to increase its performance. Pfeffer and Salancik (2003, p. 147 ) noted that the development of norms reduces uncertainty and increases predictability. For this reason, norms enable stable exchange relationships, and the possibility of future business may in itself serve as an enforcement device (Rokkan et al. 2003) . Exploitation and safeguarding issues are the cause of uncertain or poor behavior of a TSI receiver. Under a high level of network norm of obligation, all members who are engaged in the network share a strong sense of obligation to maintain a good relationship. When prescribed behaviors such as a duty of sincere communication, prompt responses, and fair treatment are breached by a buyer that enjoys the benefits of a TSI, the buyer is more likely to be strongly punished by other members. By breaching the norm of obligation, the buyer reduces predictability and hence increases uncertainty, which disturbs ongoing relationships. In addition, as the network norm of obligation is more strongly shared by the network members, a member would need to be justified before accusing a partner of some failure of goodwill if a buyer decided to terminate its relationship with its supplier (Dore 1983) . The supplier could be relieved from termination concern and expect relationship continuity unless it shows a lack of sincerity. As a longterm relationship is expected, there is a greater likelihood of commitment (Ganesan 1994) . Therefore, as the network norm of obligation increases, a seller's TSI and its performance will be greatly increased. Based on the argument, this study hypothesized as follows.
H1:
The greater the level of network obligation, the stronger the positive relationship between TSI and firm performance.
Opportunism and the Network Norm of Obligation
Previous studied argued (John 1984 ) that the negative relationship between opportunism and firm performance will be moderated by a network norm of obligation. More specifically, under a high level of a network norm of obligation, opportunism of the supplier will be reduced. Opportunism is destructive to both relationships and performance and is defined as "self-interest seeking with guile (Williamson 1975) ." Opportunism also involves making "false or empty, that is, self-disbelieved, threats and promises" in the expectation that individual advantage will thereby be realized (Goffman 1969; Williamson 1975 ). In the current study, we follow Wathne and Heide's (2000) definition of opportunism: "one party is engaging in behaviors that were explicitly or implicitly prohibited," such as altering or hiding facts and making false promises to exchange partners. By proscribing behaviors of exchange partners to prevent pursuit of individual goals, norms facilitate a stable system and the relationship as a whole (Heide and John 1992) . All the network members recognize an obligation to try to maintain the relationship (Dore 1983) . Even if a supplier is faced with obtaining advantages by hiding some information, the supplier would not do it because it recognizes how to behave in exchange relationships. Sincere communication instills trust, aligns personal and collective goals, and encourages the seller to maintain favorable perceptions about the relationship (Gassenheimer et al. 1996) . Quick responses to requests also increase favorable impressions about the responding organizations (Waung and Brice 2007) , and they are perceived as behaving within the prescribed norms. In addition, as perceived unfairness had the greatest negative impact on channel member cooperation and flexibility (Samaha et al. 2011) , the reverse should also be true: that perceived fairness should have a positive impact on cooperation and flexibility.
When the supplier received good impressions and a perception of fair treatment, it would lose the motivation to hide or distort any information that could be used to gain personal benefits. Furthermore, social sanctions become more powerful when a norm is established in a network, and the value is shared among network members. It is conceivable that, if a punishment is imposed by many actors, it would be more effective. Such punishment could put an opportunistic supplier in danger of terminating relationships not only with its focal buyer, but with other buyers as well. Therefore, a network norm of obligation would mitigate and reduce the risk of opportunistic behaviors (Cannon et al. 2000) . Based on the argument, this study hypothesized as follows: H2: The greater the level of network obligation, the weaker the negative relationship between opportunism and firm performance.
Technological Uncertainty and the Network Norm of Obligation
Previous studied argued (Heide and John 1990 ) that the negative relationship between technological uncertainty and firm performance will be moderated by a network norm of obligation. To be more specific, as the degree of network obligation increases, the negative impact of technological uncertainty on performance will be reduced. A previous study (Heide and John 1990 ) defined environmental uncertainty is defined as "unanticipated changes in circumstances surrounding an exchange." Researchers have identified some dimensions of uncertainty: technological unpredictability, volume unpredictability, and performance ambiguity (Heide and John 1990) , environmental volatility and environmental diversity (Klein et al. 1990) , and reputation and price-making mechanisms as behavioral uncertainty and demand uncertainty (Grewal et al. 2010) . A network norm of obligation reduces intentions to terminate exchange relationships in unpredictable technological environments. Without a network norm of obligation, switching from one supplier to another supplier during such a difficult period seems more likely. Some scholars (Joshi and Stump 1999) showed that, when manufacturers face technological uncertainty, they are more likely to avoid long-term relationships with their suppliers in order to cope with the unstable environment. A network norm of obligation provides a general frame of reference, order, and standards in order to guide and assess appropriate behavior in uncertain and ambiguous situations (Cannon et al. 2000) . When there is a high level of network norm of obligation, terminating a relationship should be justified (Dore 1983) . This implies that the rationale behind terminating a relationship should be reasonably understood by other network members. The rationale would indicate some failure of goodwill such as pursuing individual interest rather than finding ways to maintain relationships. Networks whose members share a high level of network norm of obligation try to communicate to help the suppliers rather than consider new suppliers. They also try to quickly respond to any requests of the suppliers. Such communication enhances supplier knowledge, which in turn improves supplier performance (Joshi 2009 ). Based on the argument, this study hypothesized as follows.
H3:
The greater the level of network obligation, the weaker the negative relationship between technological uncertainty and firm performance.
Methodology
Research Context
The focus of this study is to investigate the effectiveness of a network level governance mechanism on supplier performance considering interactions with TCE factors, TSI, opportunism, and technological uncertainty. To examine the effectiveness, buyers were asked how they perceive TSIs, opportunism, technological uncertainty, and the performance of the suppliers. The buyers were also asked questions about the network norm of obligation in their network, which includes the suppliers as network members. In this study, the buyers are the first-tier suppliers of Korean engineering companies (plant manufacturing companies), and suppliers are the suppliers to the first-tier suppliers (i.e., second-tier suppliers of the manufacturing companies) This research was conducted through a mail survey distributed to the mangers working for the first-tier suppliers of engineering companies. Contact information of the first-tier suppliers was obtained from mangers working for the engineering companies (i.e., top manufacturing companies). This study used multi-item measures that were developed and studied in extant studies. However, to enhance the respondents' understanding of items, and only if necessary, the original questions established in previous studies (Ganesan 1994) were modified. After modifying the items, the questions were sent to some of the buyers to make sure all issues and items were fully understood. The procedures were revised several times, and the items were finalized. The questionnaires were sent by mail, together with a cover letter that explained the purpose of the survey, to 500 companies, and 154 (31%) companies sent back responses. Among them, 10 questionnaires were eliminated because of excessive missing answers. Therefore, 144 samples were used for the analysis.
Measure Development
Perceptions of supplier TSI were adapted for this study from the research of Ganesan (1994) . For this study, the buyers were asked to estimate the degree of seller TSI. The items focused on the extent to which sellers made investments for transactions only and would have been damaged in the case of switching transaction partners.
Perceptions of supplier opportunism were adapted from John (1984) and measured the seller's willingness to take advantage of the buyers' difficulties using deceitful means (Josh and Stump 1999) .
Technological uncertainty is derived from Heide and John (1990) and described the difficulty in predicting technological changes in the main product.
Perceptions of supplier performance describe the extent to which buyers are satisfied with the performance of sellers, including delivery accuracy, product quality, and supply capacity. The network norm of obligation scale is developed based on Waung and Brice (2007) and assesses the degree to which the buyers, the buyers' buyers (engineering firms), and the suppliers are obligated to be sincere in communication, to respond to requirements, and to be respectful to each other. In the current study, the five constructs are TSI, opportunism, technological uncertainty, performance, and network obligation. All items used a seven-point, Likert-type scale anchored by 1 ("strongly disagree") and 7 ("strongly agree"). To validate and purify the measures, a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) model is used to assess construct validity (Grewal et al. 2010 TABLE 2 shows each construct items, AVE value, and factor loading. All factor loadings are greater than 0.7 
Data Analysis and Results
Statistically, the current research hypotheses investigate the effects of three variables (perceived supplier TSI, perceived supplier opportunism, and technological uncertainty) on perceived supplier performance and predict that these effects would change across the range of network level governance mechanisms (i.e., network obligation). To test the hypotheses, structural equation modeling (SEM), AMOS 18, was applied (TABLE 5) .
To test the moderating roles of network obligation, the samples were divided into two groups (Gu et al., 2010 ) -high and low levels of a network norm of obligation (TA-BLE 6). As argued, the network norm of obligation appears to have different effects with different situations. A high level of network norm of obligation has a positive influence on TSI and opportunism, yet it has a negative influence on technological uncertainty. Under a high level of network norm of obligation, the positive relationship between TSI and performance becomes stronger, thus H1 is supported (β=.50, p<.00). The negative relationship between supplier opportunism and its performance becomes weaker as the network norm of obligation increases, thus H2 is supported (β= -.22, p<0.05) . In contrast to the prior effect, a high level of network norm of obligation worsens the relationship between technological uncertainty and firm performance. Differing from the expectation, where there is a low level of network norm of obligation, the negative effect of technological uncertainty is greatly reduced; thus, H3 is not supported (β = -.06, p<.60).
Discussion
Since many researchers have emphasized the need to go beyond the traditional focus on individual dyadic relationships, some scholars have studied interdyadic relationships (Wathne et al. 2001; Antia and Frazier 2001) . In spite of a growing body of research investigating the network effect on dyadic relationships, the predominant focus in much of the existing empirical literature has been on individual dyadic relationships. In addition, the network level governance approach is very rare. Recognizing the gaps, the current research attempted to investigate the effectiveness of a network-oriented governance mechanism in a dyadic relationship and empirically tested the effectiveness.
The current study offers contributions to the existing literature. This study suggests the obligational character of relational norms. Most relational norms that have appeared in marketing channel literature include information sharing, flexibility, and solidarity. These constructs explain how firm behaviors are affected and changed by relational norms. However, as Dore's (1983) study revealed, norms also have an obligational component. Otherwise, they would not be a sufficient mechanism to manage channel relationships. Thus, the current study focuses on norm obligational components. Second, the current study developed a construct of network norm of obligation. According to the study results, under a high level of network norm of obligation, the positive relationship between TSI and performance became stronger, and the negative relationship between opportunism and performance became weaker. However, different from expectation, it was found to have a negative impact on the relationship between technological uncertainty and performance. It seems that firms may feel such an obligation to be a burden, especially when they face uncertain situations. It is conceivable that such norms could be helpful at some times but may not be helpful in other circumstances. A sense of obligation or duty also imposes an enforcement component; therefore, firms that face uncertainty may feel burdens in coping with the uncertainty and fulfilling their obligations at the same time.
Managerial Implications
A network norm of obligation has costs as well as benefits. As shown from the study results, a network norm of obligation is an effective means of managing channel relationships. When all channel members share a sense of duty, it could effectively reduce exchange partners' opportunism. A network norm of obligation was also found to protect parties invested in a specific exchange relationship. However, managers should be aware that such a widely spread sense of duty also constrains the behaviors of the firm. When a network norm of obligation is strongly established, decision making within a firm is more likely be influenced by other firms that are not a part of the exchange relationship. Thus, mangers should know that, while creating such norms brings managerial effectiveness, there are also burdens involved.
Limitation and Future Research
Despite its contributions, this research study has some limitations. First, the construct of network norm of obligation was only viewed through the buyer's perspective. That is, the operation of network norm of obligation has an either possibility of showing the buyer's only view or of not representing the other network members. This can cause a problem of imbalance between the degrees of network norm of obligation that the buyer and its network members evaluate. When they buyer think that the degree of its network norm of obligation is very strong, other network members may not agree with that. Second, the concept of network norm of obligation has not introduced in marketing field yet. When a new concept is newly introduced, it should be well developed in terms of abstraction. When the abstraction is operationalized and to be statistically proved, Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) should be conducted using a data set that is different from other data set that is used for proving hypothesis. However, we did not conduct EFA. Third, questionnaires were distributed only to the prime suppliers of top manufacturers. TSI, opportunism, and firm performance of second-tier suppliers were measured as perceptions of the prime suppliers. Therefore, the evaluation of the level of performance and opportunism were possibly, but not necessarily, inaccurate. Future research needs to conduct EFA using different data set to increase the reliability and justification of its operationalization. Also it would be better to get the data from all network members to reflect the view of all the network members.
